

AIR

SECRET

ECMA-9823

15. Feb. 1954

Chief, EE, ATTN: Chief, SR

(Attn: [])

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

AEQUOR/REDSOX/Operational

ROUTING	
#1	3
#2	3
#3	0/3
#4	

Review of AEQUOR KUFIRE collaboration with AEGAMBISTA 1

1. Certain incidents, which have occurred within the past few months under Project AEQUOR, require that an appraisal of Project AEQUOR results be made at this time as well as an evaluation relative to the feasibility of continuing our KUFIRE collaboration with AEGAMBISTA 1.
2. In the attempt to procure, assess, and prepare a team for 1954 operations, it became evident to a greater extent than heretofore that AEGAMBISTA 1 is suffering from a dearth of suitable agent candidate material. In view of the fact that there was no 1953 dispatch under Project AEQUOR, it became particularly desirable that an AEQUOR team be prepared for dispatch in 1954 and be utilized in support of Team II or in undertaking an independent mission to insure KUFIRE coverage of the Byelorussian SSR. Although it was anticipated that the team would be prepared basically for support purposes of Team II, it was stressed that the candidates would also have to be sufficiently versatile and qualified to undertake an independent-type mission in view of the current unresolved status of Team II.
3. Initially it was envisioned that a four-man team would be prepared for 1954 operations but it soon became apparent that it would prove extremely difficult to procure four qualified AEGAMBISTA 1 candidates for this purpose. In acquiescing to prepare a three-man team, it was stressed that we were desirous of having a strong leader-type candidate who would overcome the initial disadvantage of not having a four-man team. AEGAMBISTA 2's immediate response was to offer AECAMPOSANTO 3 and 10, both of whom had been previously rejected, the former for security reasons and the latter because he lacked the desired leadership capabilities. After the AECAMPOSANTO 3 utilization issue was resolved (by rejecting him categorically), not without some bitterness and recrimination, AEGAMBISTA 2 agreed to recruit the strong leader-type and another member with which to form a three-man team with AECAMPOSANTO 10. This resulted in the acquisition of AECAMPOSANTO 11 as well as attempts to acquire Identity A. Subsequent events revealed that the former was suitable only as a team member and that the latter refused to volunteer for the task.
4. Faced with the issue of not being able to prepare a team, for support purposes or otherwise, we agreed to consider the utilization of a two-man team providing both candidates were equally qualified to undertake either a support or independent type mission. Discussions with and assessment of AECAMPOSANTO 11 indicated, qualifications-wise, that he would be able to under-

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

SECRET

KAPOK

take either mission equally well but only as a team member. However, when during the course of discussions with ARGAMPONANTO 11 he revealed a disturbingly great amount of knowledge about the previous ARGUOR operations, it was felt that he could not be used, notwithstanding his qualifications, except in a support role because of the security implications resultant from his knowledgeability.

5. Therefore when it became obvious that we would not be able to meet the 21 January 1954 HNELESTON flight due to the non-appearance of ARGAMPONANTO 10, it was felt that the preparation of ARGAMPONANTOS 10 and 11 would be a doubtful venture in that ARGAMPONANTO 10's non-suitability as a leader or as a W/T operator (based on the December 1951 assessment) were not compensated for by ARGAMPONANTO 11's shortcomings. Inability to meet the HNELESTON flight deadline would, of necessity, also force our timetable one or more months back and would not permit us to prepare and train the candidates as intensively as had been planned. Consequently, though not in entirety, because of the lack of leadership qualifications in either of the two candidates and because of the inability to meet the flight deadline, both the Field and Headquarters mutually agreed that the best course of action would be to halt or postpone any preparation of ARGUOR Team III at this time.

6. Discussions with ARGAMBISTA 2 subsequently revealed that ARGAMPONANTO 10 was unable to procure a visa to travel to Germany as late as 6 February 1954. The reasons for his inability to procure a visa, in excess of a month after the date on which he was scheduled to arrive in MOB for operational purposes, have not been clarified to date. Not to be excluded, however, is the possibility that ARGAMPONANTO 10 was never even willing to accept the assignment which was proposed to him.

7. All of the above strongly emphasizes the inadequacy of the currently existing ARGAMBISTA 1-KUBARK KUPINE arrangement. In addition it also indicates the insufficiency of our relationship with ARGAMBISTA 2, the principal agent for Project ARGUOR. In view of ARGAMBISTA 2's political activities within ARGAMBISTA 1 and in view of his professional (clinical) interests and obligations which require a major portion of his time, he has come to be of increasingly less value to Project ARGUOR during the past year. These personal activities have compelled ARGAMBISTA 2 to assign a great portion of his operational activities to his subordinates within ARGAMBISTA 1. This in itself was not discouraged in that it provided valuable experience to several high-level principal agent types within ARGAMBISTA 1. This, however, has resulted in inadequate performance, and in some cases non-performance, of tasks which are mandatory under any KUBARK-minority nationality collaboration and which require constant attention of the principal agent himself. Furthermore, he has displayed a gross lack of understanding of operational matters which require his full attention, participation and advice. This state of affairs has undoubtedly been exacerbated as a result of ARGAMBISTA 2's undertaking too many activities but is basically attributable to his impatience, temperament, and inability to grasp the need for a clandestine mentality.

8. ARGAMBISTA 2's recent admission that the ARGAMBISTA 1 emigration in Europe is dry and that he would therefore be unable to provide any other

SECRET

SECRET
KAPOR

candidates for future ABQUOR operations under the present arrangement strongly emphasizes what had been suspected for some time in the past. Although AECAMBISTA 2 alleges that the emigration has dried up as a result of KUBARK inactivity (inability to provide an overt rallying point, i.e., military guard company or cadre school), it is believed that his own actions have not in any way assisted him in maintaining the intimate contact necessary with the rank and file of any emigration. Aside from an occasional recruiting trip to one country or another, AECAMBISTA 2 has maintained only loose and sporadic contact (primarily via mail) with the local AECAMBISTA 1 leaders and little or none with the rank and file except through less experienced subordinates. This type of contact has not permitted him to be acquainted with the local situation in any area, the results of which are evident after his return from the unsuccessful recruiting trips.

9. Admittedly, KUBARK may be partially responsible for this dearth of agent candidate material in that it has been unable to carry through, to date, on any one of the projects proposed for the AECAMBISTA 1 emigration, i.e., military guard company, cadre school, area rep program, all of which are favorite scape-goats for AECAMBISTAS 2 and 4 in their attempt to justify or explain the reason for lack of success in recruiting. However, at this time it is necessary to recognize the fact that the AECAMBISTA 1 emigration in Europe is dry inasmuch as the census results, indicating an abundance of AECAMBISTA 1 candidates for "active national liberation work", are grossly inconsistent with the actual results from the recent recruiting trip for ABQUOR Team III. Therefore, although the desired rallying point could be provided by KUBARK, it would not be the panacea for all of AECAMBISTA 1's ills inasmuch as the AECAMBISTA 1 is basically limited in its assets and capabilities.

10. When in addition to the above inadequacies of the KUBARK-AECAMBISTA 1 collaboration is added the security laxity extant within AECAMBISTA 1, it behooves KUBARK to change or reorganize the existing setup. The mass processing, assessment and subsequent rejection and dispersal into the emigration of AECAMBISTA 1 candidates (1951-52) has alerted large sections of the entire emigration in all of Europe to the type of "active national liberation work" being undertaken by AECAMBISTA 1 as well as having indicated to the emigration some evidence of its collaboration with American intelligence. Consequently, it has become virtually impossible to withdraw a candidate from the European emigration without alerting it to the fact that certain activities of a clandestine nature are being undertaken. It has become especially difficult to secrete almost any and all facets of this collaboration from groups from whence individuals are employed to implement various aspects of operational activity. Reference is being made in this case to the AECAMBISTA 1 home located in Louvain, Belgium, which has been used for operational purposes (routing and housing of candidates enroute to MOS) at various instances and from whence AECAMBISTA 2 has drawn his principal confidants and subordinates to execute certain operational tasks (with our approval). Therefore, in spite of whatever security precautions may have been taken, certain residents of the home are able to deduce the nature of almost all of the activities which are being undertaken. It is felt, however, that AECAMBISTA 2 has also been somewhat lax in enforcing and maintaining the security necessary for such activities for reasons outlined in paragraph 7 above. This became painfully evident after discussions with AECAMPOSANTO 11. A separate

SECRET
KAPOR

SECRET

dispatch will follow outlining the extent to which it is felt security may have been compromised within AEGAMBISTA 1.

11. It is therefore recommended that the existing arrangement be scrapped in the interests of security and efficiency, salvaging those aspects of our collaborational activity which it is desired to retain but to be continued on a more secure basis. Assuming that KUBARK coverage of the Byelorussian SSR is still desired through AEQUOR KUFIRE this implies that all of the AEGAMBISTA 1 personnel being currently utilized for REDBOX operational purposes be dropped with the possible exception of AEGAMBISTA 11. Furthermore, it is recommended that emphasis on the recruitment of AEGAMBISTA 1 candidates be transferred to PEPRIME and Canada. Transferral of activity from Europe would permit establishment of a more secure arrangement and would also permit far closer case officer guidance of any activities undertaken by the AEGAMBISTA 1 principal agent in PEPRIME under any new KUBARK-AEGAMBISTA 1 KUFIRE effort. Such transfer of emphasis to PEPRIME does not necessarily imply complete severance of all AEGAMBISTA 1 recruitment efforts in Europe which could be performed to a limited extent under the strict guidance of the SR representative [] should they be desired.

12. AEGAMBISTA 11 is highly recommended for the projected assignment of AEGAMBISTA 1 principal agent in PEPRIME. He has displayed much initiative and foresight in the performance of various operational tasks assigned him in the past; more important, he is more or less a political non-entity within AEGAMBISTA 1 and therefore unstained in the eyes of the emigration. Inasmuch as AEGAMBISTA 11 has proved himself amenable to close case officer supervision in the past, it is felt that he can, under close guidance of the Headquarters case officer, be developed into a most capable leader for our purposes. AEGAMBISTA 11 will be concluding his academic efforts in June and will be ready for utilization for our purposes at that time. In addition to AEGAMBISTA 11, there are several other high-level scholars from AEGAMBISTA 1 within PEPRIME who could be used to support AEGAMBISTA 11 for any purpose not currently envisioned.

13. If the AEQUOR KUFIRE activities are transferred to PEPRIME, the funding of the KUGOWN portion of Project AEQUOR can be handled once a month [] the precedent for which has already been established.

14. The above recommendation is made notwithstanding whatever may be uncovered during the course of the check currently being made of the security compromise within AEGAMBISTA 1. In establishing the new arrangement along the lines outlined above, or any suitable variant, the entire Louvain complex will be excluded from any future collaboration and will not be permitted to participate in any of the operational activities. The basic question resolves itself into one of whether or not KUBARK is desirous of continuing exploitation of the AEGAMBISTA 1 emigration in a new locale and under a new, and possibly a more secure, modus operandi.

15. If the answer to the question posed in paragraph 14 above, is other than negative, CSOB requests that Headquarters' approval be granted to permit laying of the framework for the new arrangement during the presence of the under-

SECRET

SECRET
KAPOK

signed case officer during his TDY tour in MOB.

Enclosure: (1)

Identity - SEPARATE COVER * DIRECT

11 February 1954

Distribution:

- 2 - HR w/2 cc. Encl. S/G
- ✓ 2 - EE w/1 cc. Encl. S/G
- 3 - COM w/3 cc. Encl. S/G
- 2 - MOB w/2 cc. Encl. S/G

SECRET
KAPOK